Pegah Rahmani
Not all logic is loud; some choices whisper, and I listen.
PhD Candidate, University of Toronto
Not all logic is loud; some choices whisper, and I listen.
PhD Candidate, University of Toronto
I am a PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Toronto. My research lies at the intersection of Behavioral Economics and Decision Theory, with a focus on how individuals make context-dependent decisions under uncertainty.
I am particularly interested in correlation-sensitive models of decision-making, especially in settings where preferences may be incomplete. My current work develops and analyzes incomplete correlation-sensitive models to better understand how individuals navigate uncertainty when standard preference assumptions fail to hold.
I am on the 2025-2026 academic job market.Interests: Behavioral Economics, Microeconomic Theory, Decision Theory, Experimental Economics
References: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, Colin Stewart
This paper provides an axiomatization of a general correlation-sensitive model of decision making under uncertainty without requiring completeness of preferences. The model is represented by a correlation-sensitive multi-utility framework. The axioms underlying the characterization are reflexivity, monotonicity, strong independence, and continuity. Whereas Lanzani (2022)’s result employs completeness, strong independence, and Archimedean continuity, the present approach replaces completeness with reflexivity and monotonicity, thereby accommodating incomplete preferences. When transitivity is additionally imposed, the model collapses to the expected multi-utility representation, Dubra et al. (2004). These results establish a unified axiomatic foundation for correlation-sensitive models and clarify the roles of incompleteness and transitivity in shaping preference representation under uncertainty.
A well-known phenomenon in the decision science literature (Loomes and Sugden 1982, Bell 1982, and Fishburn 1982) is that anticipated regret affects choices and valuations. We analyze Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) famous decision problem of the certainty effect – a special case of the common ratio effect ´a la Allais (1953) as well as extensively documented probability insensitivity in mid-ranges. We propose that these phenomena are, in fact, manifestations of anticipated regret; offer a behavioral definition of anticipated regret without committing to a specific functional representation; and document evidence of anticipated regret in a controlled lab setting. We find that more than half of our participants exhibit strict Certainty Effect, and about two-fifths of them exhibit aversion to anticipated regret.
Course Instructor:
Course materials are available upon request.
TA:
Phone: 437-987-1545
Email: pegah.rahmani@mail.utoronto.ca
Office:
Office 40, Economics Department, University of Toronto
Max Gluskin House, 150 St. George Street
Toronto ON M5S 3G7
Canada
Links: TEEL @ UofT | LinkedIn